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THESIS
- ooo0ooo------
The Principle of Mechanical Equivalents
as applied in Patent Cases.
. ..By- ....
ROLLIN JGH REID,
-xxxXxxx ...
-o r n : l l U -.-i";_,e r s i t y ,
]L 92.

I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N.
The aim of the present article is to explain the
nature cf a mechanical equivaleint, what it is, and how
its principles are applied in the patent law. In
order to do this, it will be necessary at the out-set
to define an equivalent, using for this; purpose short
quotations from some of the many decisions in our ed-
eral Courts which have grown up since the passage of th
act of April 10, 1790. in doing so I will confine
myself to the ,ecisions of our Federal Coutts, as the
discussion of the English cases would lead us far out-
side of the scope of the present article. The cases
involving only mechanical equivalents will be referred
to, though many if not all of the rules asserted, relat-
ing to mechanical equivalents would likewise, by analogy,
2apply to chemical equivalents. After coming to a
thorough understanding of what an equivalent is, I will
endeavor to show who can invoke its doctrine, and the
extent to which it applies, whether depending upon thp
fact that the inventor is a pioneer in his art, or only
improver of an already known device.
The tcrm"equivalent" is used in the decisions in
two different ways, and meaning two distinct thiftgs,
which must be kept coistantly in rind while reading the
cases. First, then in its ordinary sense it is
synonymou, with identity (1). It denotes the corres-
pondence between agencies which p ,rform the same fun--
tions, and havQ. I the same operative means, relating to
. combinp.tion or device as a whole, rather than to any
particular part or ingredient of the combination (2).
In its second and more restricted or technical sense,
denoting the means or mekani which is used to accomplish
the same result. Judge Sprague in the celebrated case
of Johnson v. Root, reported in 1 Fisher, 357, very
carefully and clearly shows this destinction. he says,
"The term equivalent as used in this class of cases, has
4two meanings. The one relates to the result.; that are
produced and the other to the mechanism ly which those
results are produced. The two things may be equi-
valent, that is, the one equivalent to the other as
producing the sEame result when they are not the same
mechanical means.
Let us iiext pass to the subject of a mechanical
equivalent what it is and what are the elements which
compose it.
At the present state of the law it is impossible
to lay down general pri~iciples, accurately defining *hat
a mechanical equivalent is, all the 1cinents co"n-uing
it, or any test which will meet every situation that may
akise, so that, we can readily distinguish whether a
particular machine is an equivalent of another one or
whether it is not. The cases in the United States
Circuit and District Courts, while many and voluminous,
aid us very little in the complete solution of this
problem.
5It is likewise evident to the thoughtful reader
that as machinery grows more and more complicated the
difficulty of determining what does and What does not
constitute an equivalent, however accurately it may be
defined, becomes more and more difficult especially so
when we remember that the decision must be reached by a
Judge who hasmade a special study of machinery. So
it becomes desirable as it is becessary, that the law
upon this subject be left free and it a measure open,
thus allowing the court, in its judicial discretion or
+>o the jury, should there be one, to determine upon all
the facts of the case being presented before it, whether
the particular" device in question does or does not in-
fringe the device of the plaintiff.
In a general way an equivalent may be said to be,
any act or substance which is known by one skilled in
the particular art;as a proper substitute for some
other act or substance employed as an element in the
invention, the substitution of which in io manner varies
6the idea of means, such substance being known at the data
of the invention.
To be a inechainical equivalent then it must be known
by one skilled in the art as a proper substitute for
the element ii question from his knowledge of the art (1),
Mr. Justice Sawyer in Carter v. Baker,(2) says
"When in mechanics one device does a particular thing
or accomplishes a particular result, every other device
.......- which skilled and experienced workmen know
will produce the same result, ------ is a known
mechanical substitute for the first device. It is suf-
ficient- ----- when a skilled mechanic sees one de-
vice doing a particular thing, that he knows the other
devices, whose use he is acquaited with, will do the
same thing." If a person has an invention, in which he
is called upon by the patent law, to make a full aad
clear description,\he has invented, and if another person
(1) Smith v. i iardhall, 10 O.G., 375; May v. Fon De
Lac Co., supra; Carter v, Baker, 4 Fish., 4041; Johnson
v. Root, supra.
(2) Carter v. Baker, 4 Fish. , 4:04.
7lookinl at that, can from ais k:owleige of t 1-e subject
pass to the other tqin_ that is used w'ithout any inven-
tion. The t.hing substituted is an equivalent. (1)
That is to say that if a 11echanic see that a par-
ticular result is accomplished ,y a weight he knows, at
once, that liae same object can be accomplished by the
slbring. Or if the object to -e accomplished is to
move by force a particular body as close to the other
as possible, and he sees that this is done by means of
a wedge. The mechanic knows from his knowledge of
C
the art, thE t a grew will accomplish the same result.
As, for example, we desire to level up the platen of aii
ordinary prifiting press, this is usually done by means
of four set-screws, each placed half uay from the center
of the platen and the corner, now if we sibstitute for
our set-screws, wedges, the wedge is a mechanical equi-
valent of the screw. Because the wedge and the
screw would both accomplish the desired purpose, namely,
the"leveling up"of the platen. It is true that the
(1) Sprague J. , in Johnson v. Root, supra.
wedge and the screw act on entirely difi'eerent princi-
ples, yet as to the particular (bject had in view, we
can readily see that either the wedge or the screw would
accomplish the desired result and for our purpose noth-
ing more nor less. If this be so, the scrlw is the
equivalent of the wedge or vica versa. But it does
not necessarily follow that th~cases the screw is the
equivalent of the wedge, or that the wedge is of the
screw.
Secondly, it must perform the same office or func-
tion as the instrument for which it is substituted,
that i$ to say, that it nust perform this office in
substantially the same way.
A late case in the Supreme Court, Crochrane v.
Deener, (1) is a good illustration in point. The
case involves a construction of Cochrane's invention for
bolting flour. Crochrane's invention it seems has
revolutionized the process of making flour. His
Pat ent -was- in e4g -by-tlqe - eveiilaft- Pe eier- ad- ethefs
(1) Crobhrane v. Deener, 94 U.S., 780; 4 Otto.
In the course of the opinion the Court said; "Although
the defendant use a flat bolter instead of a reel, and
used different kinds of valves for feeding and deliver-
ing the meal without allowing the air to pass, yet they
eiploy the combination of devices described in their
claim. They use the collecting chamber for the same
purpose a that pointed out in the patent and used it
in connection with a boiler, air pipe, and valves for
feeding and delivering the meal without allowing the
air to pass therewith, each effecting the same separate
purpose, and all combined effecting the same general
purpose, which the like parts are intended to accom-
a
plish in Crochrane's bolting appk atus. These parts
having the same pu±tpose, and in the same combination,
and effecting that purpose in substantially the same
manner are the equivalents of each other in that regard.
The Court in the case of May v. Fon De Lac Co.,
cited supra, (i) says, the question is whether the given
effect is produced substantially by the same mode of
(1) May v. Fon De Lac Co., 27 Fed., 691, supra p. 6.
10
operation and by the same combination of powers and de-
vices in both machines. The inquiry should be whether
the defendant's device is in substance and effect only
a colorable evasion of the plaintiff's contrivance, or
whether it is really a new and substantially different
thing. If the defendant has taken the same general
plan and applied it for the same purpose, and produced
the same effect in substantially the same mode, it will
be in contemplation of the patent 1m the same thing.
In order to avoid the charge of infringement the
substituted ingredient must be a new one, or must per-
form a sulstant1illy different function. (1) Prof.
Robinson in his valuable work upon Patent Law discusses
the whole doctrine of equivalents quite thoroughly. I
take a short quotation from section 253, of that work.
"A change in the idea of means is a change of substance,
demanding an operation of the creative faculties, and
producing either a new inve2-tion or an improvement on
the old."
(1) Webster v. Brunswick Carpet Co., 5 0.G., 522.
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It is evident f rom our discusion that mere color-
able or evasive differences cannot defeat the right of
the originaniventor.(1) Thus the substitution of an
iron frame for one mvie of wood, all the other parts of
the two combinations being identical, ,. is an infringe-
ment (2). To the same effect i; the case of Putnam
v. Hutinson, (3) where thle use of rubber stoppers in
bottles was held the equivalent of orrinary plugs.
Another illustration is that of a mowing machine for
cutting sea weed; (4) the plaintiff used a vertical
vibrating lever pivited near the center;-the defendant
substituted in its place a vertical revolving shaft with
a cfank attached, The Courts held that the crank and
shaft being an equivalent of the vibrating lever; in-
fringement was established.
That two machines produce the same effect will not
justify the assertion that they are substantially the
(1) May v. Fon De Lao Co, supra pp. 6, 9.
(2) Holbrook v. Small, 10 O.G., 508,
(3) Putnam v. Hutinson, 12 Fed., 131.
(4) Piper v. Shedd, 26 Fed., 151.
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same, or that the device-is used by one are therefore
equivalents for throse of the other (i). But neverthe-
less mere formal changes will not avoid the charge of
infringement. This was one of the earliest establish-
ed principles of patent law (2). The tioctrine is now
well settled as a citation of authorities will show. (3)
Mr. Justice Clifford, the jurist to whose ability the
developement of the patent law may be said to be largely
due, said in the early case of the Whip Co. against
Lombard (4),"Mere formal alterations of a combination of
latters patent do not constitute any defence #o the
charge of infringement." If two machines be substant-
ially the same and operate in the same manner, though
they differ in form, proportions and utility they are
the same in principle. (5) The doctrine is repeated in
~- ---------------------------------------------
(1) Burrv. Duryer, I Wallace, 531.
(2) Vincent v. Mathison, 3 Wash., 602; Odine v.
Winkley, 2 Gill., 54.
(3) Roberts v. Harnden, 2 Cliff., 506; Whip Co v.
Lombard 4 Cliff., 405; Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall., 187;
Tathon v. LeRoy, 2 Blach., 474; Graham v. Geneva Co.,
11 Fed., 138; Webster v. Brunswick Carpet Co., supra;
Corvase v. Canon, 9 0.G., 105; Crochrane v. Deener,supra',
May v. Fon De Lac Co., supra; Walker v. City of Terre-
Haute, 44 Fed., 70.
(4) £iip Co. v. Lombard, 4 Cliff'., 504.
(5) Odiemie v. Winkiey, 2 Gill., 54.
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two late case to quote; "The mechanism of the two mach-
ines in v -rious particulars is quite unlike in form, and
their dissimilarity is more apparent from the fact that
defendant's machine is one where the cutting apparatus
is forward of the axlh wheel.- ----- -I am of the
opinion that the difference between defendant's and com-
plainant's machines are differences of foem and not of'
substance."(1) The real invention in Walker v. the
City of Terre Houte,(44 Fed., 70), consisted in the com-
bination of the designated elements acting in co-oper-
ation to accomplish a specified result, and the patent
was not limited to the precise forms of the elements
shown in the drawings. Elements possessing the
essential qualities and performing the same functions as
those described, although differing in mere mechanical
form vere covered by the original patent. A conibin-
ation patent earniot be evaded by a mere formal variation
af all or part of the elements.
Our next question whether the omission of a part of
- -------------------- 
-- -----------------------------
(1) Grahamn v. Geneva Co. , 11 Fed., 1-138.
the device of a patent retaining the remaindr isl L
stfficient to avoid the charge of infringement. Pre-
sents a question of some difficulty. In this class of
combination patents the statement, that the charge of
infringement is not made out, unless all the parts or
elements of the plaintiff's patent are used, (1) is
perhaps not to br$q'1 for a general propcxsition, with
the limitation that if somw of the parts of the plain-
tiff's combination can be proved to be entirely unessen-
tial to the complete working of the combination, the
immaterial part ot!. parts may be omitted, and the use of
the rema:niiig parts will be an infringement. (2) &
good illustration of this proposition is the cellebrated
case in the Supreme Court of Pouty v. Ruggles,(3) where
these facts are present. The ilaintifr invented a
plow which was so arranged that when the point of the
plow while cutting through the earth struck a stone or
pther substance that it could not plow through, the 111
----------------------------------------------------
(1) Pouty v. Ruggies, 16 Pet., 336; Tobey v. Colly,
34 0.G., 1276; Voss v. Fisher, 5 Sup.Ct.Rep., 507 at 511l
West Lake v. Carter, 4 0.G., 636; Resull v. Lindslay,
113 U.S., 102; Robiinson on .-atents, & Walker on Patents,
+251.
(2) West Lake v. Carter, 4 O.G., 636; Venee v.
Campbell, 1 Black, 427.
(3)Pouty v. Ruggles, 16 Vet., 336.
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point of the plow would slip back leaving the obstruc-
tion in the ground. His device was a patent for a
combination as follows: first an ordinary plow fastened
to a wooden beam in such a manner that the point of the
plow formed an angle with the ground thus tending to
hold the plow in the ground when actually plowing, about
half way from the point of the plow, wi the ent which
was pivoted to the horizontal beam, was an arm extending
backward runni.Ig upward so as to pass through t'e end of
the beam which was morticed to receive it. His third
elemeng was a bolt and arm which passed through this
beam just in front of and at right angles to this mor-
tice, so that by screwing up the bolt the friction upon
the arm passing through the mortice was increased untill
it was sufficiently tight to hold the standard of the
plow in its place when in use. A stone or other im-
movable substance resting the Point of the plow instead
of stopping the horses, would push upon this point suf-
ficiently to move it back away.from its original posi-
16
sition by driving the back arm of the plow up through
the mortive of the shaft: in this way the plow would
pass over the obstruction without stopping the team or
throwing the driver off of his feet.
The device of the defendant omits 6ntirely the arm
of the plaintiff's plow. having the standard on which
the shire is fastened, pass up throug i the mortice in
the horizontal beam then curving forward and pivoted to
the beam. He thus accomplishes the same result az did
the plaintiffj to wit; providing a means whereby the
point is allowed to pass obstructions without the neces-
sity of stopping the horses, backing up (to remove the
plow) and starting over again.
But his plow is not as strong as that of the plain-
tiff',, the arm in the plaintiff's device acted as a
brace and materially increased the strength of the plow.
The defendant in order to get the strength required to
make his plow useful, is obliged to largely increase the
sire of the standard on which the shire is .ttached,
17
making it heavy enough to stand the necessary strain
to which plows are subject.
The elements usei by tie plaintiff being all old,
his patent is for the combination of the three. The
Court says, Ci) The use of any two of the three parts
cronlyof two.confined with a third is substantially
different in form or in the means of its arrangement and
connection with the others, is, therefore, not the thing
patented. It is not the same combination if it sub-
stantially differs in any of its parts. The joiging
of the standard into the beam, and its extention back-
ward from the bolt, are both treated by plaintif*' as es-
sential parts of their combination for the purpose of
brace and draft, consequently the use of either alone,
by the defendant would not be the same improvement nor
infringe the patent of the plaintiff.
The Circuit Court in Voss v. Fisher, (2) discussing
the same question says, "where one patented combination
is asserted to be an equivalent of another device in one,
(1) Pouty v. Ruggles, supra, see page 341 of case.
(2) Voss v. Fisher, 5 Suo.Ct.R., 507 at 511.
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to be an equivalent of -,. a device in the
other, must perf'orm the same functions. And therefore
there is one element of the plainti'ff's patented combi,-
ation which the det'endants do not use, and for which t .
they do not employ an equivalent. It follows that
they do not infringe the plaintiff's patent. This
principle has recently been approved by the Supreme
Court in Roswell v. Lindsay, 113 U.S., at page 102,
where the authorties are collected and discussed.
So a patent is not infringed by a combination which
varies from that patented in the omission of one of the
operative parts and the substitution of another part
substatially different in.its construction and oper-
ation not withstaiding the fact it serves the same
purpose.(l)
But a cobfoination will be infringed if parts of the
elements are employed and for otheAmechanical equiva-
lents are used.(2) This qualification if indeed it
may be deemed a qualification of t: e general rule at
(1) Eames v. Godfrey, 1 Wall, 78; Schmidt v. Truse;
Tobey v. Coly, 34 0.G. 1076; Smith v. Marshall, 10 0.G.75.,
(2) Simpson R.R., 10 How., 329;EAmes v. Godfrey,supra.
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all, is constantly met with in practice and for the
purpose of the ]Practitioner is of more importance than
the general rule. We shall have reason to refer to i
it more in detail later (1).
Where the change is merely colorableinfringement L5
69 course is present- this appears to be so evident that
the 7citation of' the numerous authorities is unnecessary.
If the instrument besides being an equivalent, ac-
complishes something useful beyond the effort or purpose
accomplished by the first patentee; it will still be an
infringement as respects what is covered by the prior
patent. (2) Because as between a device coym eded to
be new and a device claimed to be infringed, the alleged
infringer could not protect himself by showing that al-
though his device wgas the equivalent of the patented
device in all its functions, andAconstruction and mode
of operation, yet by other additional features it poss-
essed other and further useful functions, though it be an
improvement upon the patented one, is as between the
(1) See pagej-/,.iQ-
(2) Converse v. Cannon, 9 O.G., 105; 2 Fish., 31,
10 O.G., !7.
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parties an appropriation of the former device. Though
the improvement of course would be patentable as an im-
provement upon the former.(!) So it may be said to be
immaterial to show that the device accomplishes more,
but if it accomplishes less it is not P.n infringement.(2)
Our last que:,tion under our definition is whether
the particular device must be a known equivalent at the
date of the invention of the patent. Mr. WPJV-r, in
his treatise upon the Law of Patents, undertakes to dis-
tinguish the 0ses and show that while abundant authority
can be found for the affirmative of the question yet the
decisions on this point are purely dicta, and in view of
some authorities which he cites, he comes to the con-
clusion that the date of the invention has nothing to do
with the question rf equivalents.
In the fall of 1865, Mr. Justi= Clifford, while at
Circuit first introduced this elomncnt irii.c the defin-
ition, in the case of The T 1nion Sugar Refinery v. Mat-
thussen, (3) where he said instructing the jury "You are
(1) Cases in proceeding notes.
(2) Walker on Patents, 251 & notes.
(3) The Union Sugar Refinery v. iiatthusse-,, 2 Fish.
629.
21
instructedi, that if you find from the evidence, that
the means of causing pressure at the nozzle used by the
defri., Were, at the date of the invention and of the
patent, confmonly known as a substitute for the means of
causing ptressure at the nozzle, which were particularly
licussed in the specification, and that consequently
those skilled in the art to which the invention apper-
tains, then the defendant cannot successfully defend him
self against the charge of infringement." The entire
defense in this case was, first, that their assignor, is
the otiginal and first inventor; secondly, that they do
not infringe. So we may say that the question was
fairly before the Court and a material question for
dmi s i on.
The next case that is cited in support of this
proposition is Roberts v. Haen (1). Mvir. Walker say
that this question is not presented in the case. The
counsel conceded during the trial and at the argument,
that the date of the invention was a material question
(1) Roberts v. Halen, 2 Clik., 506.
tending to define what an equivalent was. But the
case hinged upon the fact that the differences between
the ice-chests of the two refrigerators was merely form-
al, they being found by the Court to be substantially
the same.
The Court in the case of the Whip Co. v. Lombard,
(1) said "if the defendant omits tntirely one of the
elements or ingredients of the pantented combination
without substituting any other ini its place, he does
not infringe the plaintiff's patent; and if he substitu-
tes another in place of one omitted, which is new, or
which performs substantially different functions even
if it is old, was not known at the date of the plain-
tiff's patont as a proper substitute, then the charge of
infringement is not maintained." In this case evi-
dence failed to sitisfy the Court that the supposed in-
vention was ever completed, and consequently the state-
ment of the Coutt must be regarded as dicta.
See also Carter v. Baker,(L Fisher v. Craig (3),
(1) Whip Co v. Lambard, 4 Cliff., 405.
(2) Carter v. Baker, 1 Saw., 516.
(3) Fisher v. Craig, 3 Saw., 79.
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Conover v. Roach, (1), where the doctrine is clearly rec-
ognizedbut the decision may be supported on other
grounds. Burden v. Corning (2), the doctrine was not
laid down in the opinion, but the importance of the date
of the inve.:tion is constantly kept in mind by the Court,
in its determination of the controversity. The same
may be said of Smith v. Dowing, 1 Fish., 64, where
House's telegraphic instrument was held not to be the
equivalent of that of Prof. Morse.
The third of i,.r. Walker's cases is that of Leynor
v. Ostramf3), this being the decision of the Supreme
Court. The opinion in this case is exceedingly long
and somewhat obscure. Juctice Clifford undertakes to
explain and clear up many of thepnuoted questions in the
patent law. The judgment of the Circuit Court was
reversed, and an injunction was granted aganist the de-
fendants for infringing the Harvester of the plaintiff.
While the doctrine ws laid down, that one device in
order to be an equivalent of another must be known at
(1) Conover v. Roach, 4 Fish., 23.
(2) Burde. v. Corning, 4 Fish,, 477.
(3) Leynor v. Ostram, 11 Wail., 516. at p. 556.
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the date of the patent. it appears not a necessary
point for deci sion as the infringement could be sustain
ed on other grounds.
In Johnsoni v. Root, 2 Cliff., 123, the case was
reversed by the Court on the ground that the verdict of
the jury vias contrary.to the evidence. The real
question Veing, whether the plaintiff had abandoned his
patent. One of the questions presented in the irgu-
ment before the Circuit Vaurt was, as to the correction
of the charge that, "If the plaintiff did not make any
such inventions as that deseribed in the third claim of
his-reissued letters patent in 1848, or if he did, and
did not reduce the same to practice in the form of an
operative sewing machine, then the jury were not author-
ized to find that the patented invention takes date
prior to the time when he filed application on his or-
iginal patent." The Court approved this charge.
Pouty v. Ruggles (1) appears to be cited as authority to
sustain the proposition, we have already sufficiently
(1) Pouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet., 336.
discussed.this case in another connection (1).
Suffice to say that this question was not decided here.
Gould v. Rees (2), is one of the well known cases
of the patent law, two issues were raised, first that
there was no infringement, second that the plaintiff was
not the first inventor of the improved device. The
case was reversed and sent back because of an incor-
rect charge to the jury. The patent was for a com-
bination all the elements of which were old. The doc-
trine was again laid down here, but the case as al-
ready sald, had to be reversed because of an incorrect
charge. The court. said, "Where the defendant in con-
structing his machine, amits entirely one of the ingre-
dients of the plaintiff's combination without substitu-
ting any other) he does not infringe; and if he substi-
tutex any other in the place of the one omitted, which
is new, or is old but not known at the date of the
plaintiff's invention as a proper substitue for the omit-
ted ingredient, then he does not infringe.
(1) Page I Y
(2) Gould v. Rees, 15 Wal., 187.
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Mr. Justict Clifford in Gills v. Weils (1), puts the
proposition in this form, "Repeated decis tons of this
C~urt have settled the rule in such cases that if the
ingredient substituted by the defendant for the one
left out in tht, defendant's machine was a newly dis-
covered one, or even an old one, performing some new
function, and also not known at the date of the plain-
tiff's patent, or a proper substitute for the ingredient
left out , the chrge of infringement cannot be maintain--
ed." The proposition is supported by seven cases.
Let us examine ^one not already referred to (2).
In Simpson v. Baltimore R.R. and Brooks v. Fisher,
(3) the -,oint is not raised, but could be established
without being inconsistent with these decisions. In
the later case the question for the jury had een whether
the defendant had omitted one of the elements of the
complainant's device.
(1) Gills v. Wells, 22 Wal., I at page 31.
(2) Caver v. Tyde, 16 Pet., 514; Simpson v. R.R. 10
How., 329; Brooks v. Fisher, 15 '1ow. , 212; Vou-rse-V
Campbell, 1 Black, 428.
(3) sBrcos v. i her,, 15 -ow., 212 at 219.
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The case of Vouse V. Campbell (1), already referred
to in another connection (,%), the question of the omis-
sion of ani immaterial ingredient in the combination
came before 'the court for adjudication.
Our next ca- is Imhauser v, Buerk, reported
in 101 U.S., 656. In 1865, Jacob Burke received a
patent for a Itc]ians time indicator, the patent was
infringed by the device of Meyer who set up as a defense
that Buerk was not the first and original inventor of
the indicator, and a general denial of the infringement.
The Court decided the ease on t-iis point and said; "
"Patentees of an invention consisting merely of a com-
bination of old ingredients are entitled to equivalents,
by which is meant that the patent in respect to each of
the respective ingredients comprising the invention cov-
ers ever- other ingredient which in the arrangement of
the parts will perform the same function, if it is well
known as a proper substitute for the one described in
the specification %t the date of the patent. Hence it
(1) Vouse v. Campbell, 1 Black, 427.
(2) Page /sj,
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follows that a party who merely subatitutes another in-
gredient for one of the ingredients of' the patented com-
bination 18 an infringer if the substance substituted
performs the same function as the ingredient for which
it is so substituted, and it appears that it is we.Al
known at the date of the ratent that it was adaptable to
that case."
It is o. necessary to carry this discusion farther
other than to say that the rule appears to be well set-
tled in England. Union v. reath, 5 H.L.Qas., 505,
where Justice Williams said that he fully agreed with
the doctrine which has been repeatedly laid down in the
course of this d~scussion, that althiough the use of a
chemical or mechanical substitute, which is a known
equivalent to the thing pointed out by the specification
and claimed as the inventiozi, amounts to an infringement
of the patent yet if the equivalent were not knwon to be
so at the date of thejpptent and specification, the use
of it is no infringement.
29
Having -. ow a general idea of the definition of an
equivalent, together with the ele!-.ents composing it; it
only remain.s to determine who is entitled to invoke the
doctrine ,-nrd to what extent.
There was at one time an attempt to prevent the
inventor of a combination from applying the doctrine of
mechanical equivalent to protect his ptent, the 6ao-is-
sioi s --t the present time are uniformly in favor of its
applicatioi. ,c, . . In Whip v. Lambard,
supra) it wai contended by the complainants, that the
patentee or owner of a patent for a combination is an
much entitled to an e ,uivalentas the patentee or oycer
of any ,0th r invention. Doubt at one time existed as
to the correctness of this proposition, but it is now
well settled in accordance with the views of the com-
plainant. Citing Gould v. -ees and Gill v. Wells.
In the former it wlas said, "Bona fide inventors of a
combination are as much entitled to equivalents as the
inventors of other patentable improvements." It is of
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course obvious that while the combination patentee is
entitled to the benefi, of the doctrine, yet from the i,.-
herent nature of this patent- the application cannot be
as broad as that of a discoverer.
The material question however)is to determine %,
whether the inventor is a pioneer in his field, whether
he is the one who first conceived the idea and made it
a
prarAicable, or whether heAmerely an impromer, find-
ing the idea in a previous device and by his ingenui!ty
perfecting and making ft -ore useful. if he is the
first or original inventor he can apply the doctrine of
equivalents in its broadest and most comprehensive
sense, even to the exclusion of one who improves and per-
fects his device, thus keeping to rimself, in a large
measure free from competition that which -e has made.
This doctrine wa- recognized and applied very far in
Clough v. Gil--ert Ce., (97 U.S., 34), the opinion of the
Court is ;y Mr. Justice Blatchford. Here Clough was
the first person who applied a valve regulation of any
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kind to the combination, "And he is entitled under the
decisions hretofore made by this court to hold F, in-
fringements all valve regulations, applied to such a com-
bination, which perform the same officd in substantially
the same way, and were known equivalents for his form of
valve regulation."
In T-c'ori ck v. Talcott (1), a leading ca e, which
has already been referred to) the Court say that if he be
the original inventor of the device or machine called
014k
the divider, he will have a right to treat all A infringer
who make dividers operating on the same principle and
performing the same functions by an analogous means or
equivalent coii binations, even though the infringing
improvement
machine being an xxfxing1mE±xwpxa upon a known mach-
ine by a mere change of form or combination of parts,
The pate:,.te<- cann-ot treat another as an infringer who
h~s not improved the original machine by use of a dif-
ferent form or combination performing the same functions.
The inventor of the first improvement cannot invoke
(1) McCormick v. Calcot:, 20 How., 402 at page 405.
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the doctrine of equivaleits to supress all other iiprove-
ments which are not mere colorable evasions of the first,
But in dealing with improvers we must narrow and
restrict our doctrine. B ecause an imnentorjwho is
only an i, prover and not the first in the art) is not
entitled to invoke, broadly, the doctrine of mechanical
equivalents so as to cover deviees -not specifically
named (1). The reason for this restriction appears
to be this. The improver and the alleged infringer
as to the prior devices stand in the same position as
to its use, nether being entitled to a patent for the
prior device and each (for our purpose) having a right
to use it; this patent is for their element or instru-
ment which improves the prior device, and not for the
entire device as improved, so when the Courts say that
their patent is to be strictly construed they mean, that
their pat1. t is niecessarily narrow being for this improve
ment only. So that a person to infrinve thoir patent
must ude their improved combination, or an equivalent
thereof.
-------------------------------------------------
(1) Tobey Co. v. Colby, 34 Q.G., 1276.
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A good illustration of this proposition is the case
of Taylor v. Garreston, 18 Blatch., where the plaintiff's
invention being only an improvement of cert,-in parts of
a known machine, he cannot treat another as an infring-
er because he has improved the previously existing
machine or machine,, by using a form, construction,
device or combination substantially different from that
invented and patented by the plaintiff, though perform-
ing the same functions.
For furthcur i±lustrations see Prof.Robinsons work
on Patents sec. 256-7.
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